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Testing the Waters : Aboriginal Title Claims 
to Water Spaces and Submerged Lands 
- An Overview 
Paula QUIG* 
[...] the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, 
organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers 
had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means1. 
This article provides an overview of some of the intriguing issues 
raised by Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged lands. 
While the Supreme Court of Canada articulated a test for proof of 
Aboriginal title in the 1997 Delgamuukw decision, they did not squarely 
address questions relating to the viability of such claims outside of the 
“dry land” contex.. Recently, a number of Aboriginal groups from across 
Canada have filed claims seeking declaraiions of Aboriginal title in areas 
such as the foreshore, the sea, the seabed, and the Great Lakes and their 
conneciing waterway.. Similar claims might also surface in Quebec in the 
near future, in areas such as the St. Lawrence Seaway. The author guides 
the reader through international developments in this area highlights 
* The author is Counsel, Department of Justice Canada, and a member of the Law Society 
of Upper Canada. She would like to take this opportunity to express special thanks to 
Lynne Huestis for sharing her expertise, thoughts and useful comments in relation to 
this article. In addition, she is grateful for the comments and support provided by her 
fellow colleagues, including Richard Boivin, Stefan Matiation, Andrew Saranchuk and 
Kerry Wilkins. Lastly, she would like to thank David Bloch for providing useful infor-
mation on developments in the United States with respect to Aboriginal claims to water 
spaces and submerged lands. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of 
the author, and do not represent the opinions or policies of the Department of Justice 
Canada. Any errors or omissions are solely those of the author. 
1. Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), [1973] S.C.R. 313 per Judson J. at 156 
[hereinafter Calder]. 
Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 45, n° 4, décembre 2004, p. 659-692 
(2004) 45 Les Cahiers de Droit 659 
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some key legal and evidentiary issues which will require serious reflection 
in the near future, and provides some final thoughss with respect to the 
fundamental role which the goal of reconciliation and the principle of 
consultation will undoubtedly play in Aboriginal title cases to water 
spaces and submergdd lands. 
L’auteure dans le présent article aborde les questions liées au titre 
autochtone sur les eaux et sur les terres submergées. Bien que la Cour 
suprême du Canada ait élaboré le test relatif à l’existenee d’un titre 
autochtone sur le territoire dans l’affaire Delgamuukw en 1997, la ques-
tion relative à l’applicaiion de ce test sur les eaux et les terres submer-
gées demeure entière. Plusieurs groupes autochtonss au Canada ont ré-
cemment déposé des actions et revendiquent un titre autochtone sur l’es-
tran, la mer, le fond marin ainsi que dans les Grands Lacs et leurs voies 
navigables. Des revendications similaires pourraient également faire sur-
face au Québec dans un proche avenir, notamment au sujet du fleuve 
Saint-Laurent. L’auteuee examine donc les récents développements à 
l’échelle internaiionaee et soulève des questions de droit et de preuve qui 
nécessiteront une réflexion approfondee dans un proche avenir. Enfin, elle 
conclut sur le rôle fondamental que seront sûrement appelés à jouer les 
principes de réconciliation et de consultation dans les revendications du 
titre autochtone sur les eaux et sur les terres submergées. 
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Over three decades have passed since Judson J. of the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) articulated his understanding of the Aboriginal interest in 
land. It would seem from his now famous words that the honourable Just-
ice was of the view that Aboriginal title claims must always be approached 
in a manner which recognizes that Aboriginal peoples were already living 
in Canada before the arrival of European settlers, and which respects and 
honours their traditional patterns and understandings of land use and oc-
cupation. 
Following the Calder decision various justices of the SCC endorsed 
Judson J.’s understanding of the nature of Aboriginal title2. The landmark 
Delgamuukw3 decision was no exception. Lamer C.J. implicitly adopted 
Justice Judson’s decision in the course of setting out the test for proof of 
Aboriginal title, which he based on exclusive occupation of land at sove-
reignty as demonstrated through both common law and Aboriginal perspec-
tives. Further, in his reasons LaForest J. explicitly endorsed the learned 
Justice’s description of Aboriginal title, stating that the foundation of 
Aboriginal title was succinctly described by Judson J. in Calder4. 
2. Relying in part on Judson J.’s remarks, Dickson J. (as he was then) wrote in Guerin v. 
The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 382, that Aboriginal peoples have a “legal right to oc-
cupy and possess certain lands, the ultimate title to which is in the Crown”. More re-
cently, Judson J.’s views were reiterated in R. v. Van derPeet, [1996] S.C.R. 507 at para. 
30 [hereinafter Van derPeet], when Lamer C.J., writing for the majority, expressed that 
the doctrine of Aboriginal rights (one aspect of which is “Aboriginal title”) arises from 
“one simple fact : when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were 
already here, living in communities on the land and participating in distinctive cultures, 
as they had done for centuries”. 
3. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw]. 
4. Ibid., para. 189 (per LaForest J.). 
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The proposition that both common law and Aboriginal perspectives 
play a prominent role in Aboriginal title determinations is likely to take on 
even greater significance in the context of those claims that fall outside of 
existing common law understandings of property ownership. Aboriginal 
title claims to water spaces5 and lands located underneath water (“sub-
merged lands”)6 clearly fit into this category. These novel claims have re-
cently surfaced in provinces such as British Columbia7, Ontario8 and New 
5. The term “water spaces” is used throughout this article to reflect the fact that many 
Aboriginal groups have claimed title to entire marine areas and ecosystems, including 
the water itself and the living and non-living natural resources in these areas, including 
minerals, oil and gas. 
6. The term “submerged lands” is used throughout this paper in recognition of the fact that 
many Aboriginal groups have claimed title to the actual lands covered or submerged by 
water. “Submerged lands” is thus meant to refer to lands such as the foreshore, the sea-
bed, the subsoil, and the beds of navigable and non-navigable lakes, rivers and streams. 
7. See : The Council of the Haida Nation et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the 
Province of British Columbia and the Attorney General of Canada, Statement of Claim, 
Action, No. L020662, Vancouver Registry, November 14, 2002 ; Ahousaht Indian Band 
and the Ahousaht Nation et al. v. The Attorney General of Canada and Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, Writ of Summons, No. S033335, 
Vancouver Registry, June 19, 2003 ; Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band et al. v. Attorney Gen-
eral of Canada and Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of British Colum-
bia, Statement of Claim, Action No. L023106, Vancouver Registry, January 31, 2003. 
See also : T. M. RANKIN, “Offshore Oil and Gas and Coastal British Columbia : The Legal 
Framework”, (2004) 62 (4) The Advocaee at 497 [hereinafter RANKIN] ; D.M. JOHNSTON, 
B.C. Offshore Development Issues : The 2002 Dunsmurr Symposium Repor,, Victoria, 
The Maritime Awards Society of Canada 2002 ; OR. BROWN and J.I. REYNOLDS “Ab-
original Title To Sea Spaces : A Comparative Study” (2004) 37 U.B.C.L. Rev. 449 [here-
inafter BROWN and REYNOLDS] ; D.J.R. MOODIE “Aboriginal Maritime Title in Nova 
Scotia : An “Extravagant and Absurd Idea” ?" (2004) 37 U B C L Rev 495 [hereinafter 
MOODIE] 
8. See: Walpole Island First Nation, Bkejwanong Territory v. Attorney General of Canada 
and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, Statement of Claim, Court File No. 00-
CV-189329, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, April 26, 2000; Chippewas of Nawash 
Unceded First Nation and Saugeen First Nation v. The Attorney General of Canada 
and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, Statement of Claim, Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice, Court File No. 03-CV-261134CM1, served January 5,2004. A motion to 
strike those portions of the above pleadings dealing with Aboriginal title to the Great 
Lakes and their connecting waterways was dismissed by Carnwath J. of the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice on May 13, 2004 (leave to appeal dismissal denied by Matlow 
J. of the Ontario Divisional Court September 15,2004). See also : E.R. TZIMAS, “Aborigi-
nal Title Claims to the Great Lakes Waters and their Connecting Waterways : The Chal-
lenges that Lie Ahead”, paper presented at the Canadian Aboriginal Law 2003 
Conference Ottawa Ontario September 10 and 11 2003. Pacific Business and Law In-
stitute 2003 [hereinafter TZIMAsl 
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Brunswick9, where Aboriginal groups have sought declarations of Aborigi-
nal title to areas such as the foreshore10, the seabed, the territorial sea of 
Canada11, and the beds of navigable waterways, including certain Canadian 
portions of the Great Lakes. Similar claims may well arise elsewhere in 
Canada in relation to both small inland waterways and large bodies of 
water, such as the St. Lawrence Seaway12. As these claims navigate their 
way through our judicial system we will be compelled to take a serious look 
at whether the common law doctrine of Aboriginal title is sufficiently flexi-
ble to deal with these particular Aboriginal interests13. This will necessitate 
consideration of the appropriateness of using the Aboriginal title test set 
9. See Eel Ground Indian Band v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and the At-
torney General of Canada, Statement of Claim, Court of Queen’s Bench of New 
Brunswick, Court File No. N/C/152/03. See also : MOODIE , supra, note 7, for discussion 
on Shubenacadie Band’s claim of Aboriginal sovereignty in the east coast (St. Mary’s 
Bay, Digby County). 
10. According to Anger and Honsberger, the foreshore is the seashore up to the point of high 
water of medium tides, between spring and neap tides : H.D. ANGERS and others, Anger 
and Honsberger : Law of Real Property, 2nd ed., vol. 2, Aurora, Canada Law Books, 
1985, at 998 [hereinafter ANGER and HONSBERGER]. 
11. Sections 4 and 5 of the Oceans Act, S.C. 1996 c. 31 (in force as of January 31, 1997) 
[hereinafter Oceans Act], provide that Canada’s territorial sea consists of a belt of sea 
that has as its inner limit the low water line along the coast or on a low-tide elevation, 
and its outer limit the line every point at which is at a distance of 12 nautical miles from 
the nearest point of the baselines. 
12. See Grand Chief Angie Barnes et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada et al., 
Amended Statement of Claim, Federal Court of Canada, Court File No. T-567-04, 
Amended April 30, 2004, in which the Mohawks of Akwesasne sought an injunction to 
prohibit ice-breaking activities in the St. Lawrence alleging, among other things, they 
hold Aboriginal title to the area. 
13. The SCC has yet to address the question of whether Aboriginal title to water spaces and 
submerged lands is theoretically possible under our current legal regime, though such 
issues have not completely fallen of its radar screen. In both R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.CR. 
139 [hereinafter Côté] and R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.CR. 101 [hereinafter Adams,, the 
Aboriginal claimants initially argued they held Aboriginal fishing rights in the claim area, 
which included waters and submerged lands, based on their Aboriginal title to that area, 
their treaty rights and the Royal Proclamaiion of 1763. However, the SCC ruled on the 
narrower ground of Aboriginal rights after finding it was simply not necessary for an 
Aboriginal group to prove title in order to show an Aboriginal right to fish in the claim 
area. (Of particular interest are the reasons of Barrette Ct. S.P.J.’ s at trial in R. v. Adams, 
[1985] 4CN.L.R. 123 at 135, as well as the reasons given by Beauregard J A. of the Court 
of Appeal of Quebec in R. v. Adams [1993] 3 C.N.L.R. 123). Furthermore in Calder 
supra note 1 the SCC made no distinction between land and water when the Nishga 
Tribal Council claimed extensive marine areas including Observatory Inlet Portland 
Canal and Portland Inlet Importantly Hall J (Spence and Laskin JJ concurring) stated 
at 174 that Aboriginal title is a right to occupy the lands and enjoy the fruits of the soil 
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out by the SCC in Delgamuukw outside of the “dry land” context and, as 
alluded to above, will signal a need for further clarification with respect to 
the precise role of Aboriginal legal traditions and perspectives in relation 
to exclusive occupation. It will also lead us to reflect on such matters as 
the nature of the Crown’s sovereignty in navigable water bodies, the inter-
play between common law public rights of navigation and fishing and ex-
clusive Aboriginal title rights, the applicability of provincial laws to s. 
91(24) lands, and the implications which a finding of Aboriginal title in the 
offshore, or in an expansive water body such as the Great Lakes, could 
have for Canada’s obligations in the international arena. 
While we do not presently have clear guidance from the courts as to 
the viability of Aboriginal title to water spaces and submerged lands, these 
unique claims may be examined with reference to those instruments pro-
vided by the courts and the legislatures to date. The fundamental purpose 
of reconciliation that underpins s. 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982u rep-
resents one such tool. In addition, the Aboriginal title test set out in 
Delgamuukw, though not specifically developed with these claims in mind, 
can serve as a useful starting point for gauging the viability of these claims. 
Given this, the following pages provide an overview of Aboriginal title 
claims to water spaces and submerged lands through the lens of these two 
instruments while also highlighting some intriguing legal and evidentiary 
issues likely to require serious reflection in the future. 
However, before embarking on this exercise it is essential to take a 
closer look at the manner in which the courts in other common law coun-
tries have dealt with those claims to water spaces and submerged lands 
which have come before them for consideration. This enables us to con-
sider the abstract issues outlined above within their practical context, and 
moves us a step closer towards grappling with the unique challenges that 
lie ahead. 
the forests and of the rivers and streams, and noted that the use of water was an integral 
part of the historic occupaiion and possession of the territory. Lastly, in her dissenting 
judgment in Van der Peet, supra, note 2, McLachlin J., as she was then, referred to the 
longstanding common law recognition of Aboriginal “interests” in waters at para. 275 
stating : “It thus emerges that the common law and those who regulated the British settle-
ment of this country predicated dealings with aboriginals on two fundamental principles. 
The first was the general principle that the Crown took subject to existing aboriginal 
interests in the lands they traditionally occupied and their adjacent waters, even though 
those interests might not be of a type recognized by British law.” [Emphasis mine] 
14. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 [hereinaf-
ter Constitution Act, 1982]. 
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1 International developments 
Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged lands have 
emerged in a number of common law countries over the course of the past 
few years. These claims have been met by both judicial and, in some cases, 
legislative intervention. The following section highlights some of the most 
significant developments coming out of Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States15. While there are key differences between the Canadian 
approach to Aboriginal title and the approaches adopted in other countries 
it is still likely that our courts will look to foreign judicial and legislative 
developments in the course of deliberating on Aboriginal title to water 
spaces and submerged lands given the paucity of Canadian case law in this 
area. 
1.1 Australia 
The Australian courts have had occasion to consider native title claims 
solely to areas below high water mark on two occasions, the first being in 
the Commonwealth of Austraiia v. Yarmirr16 case, and the second being in 
the Lardil Peoples v. State of Queensland71 case. 
The Yarmirr case dealt with a claim under s. 223 of the Native Title 
Actn to exclusive native title rights and interests to the sea and seabed in 
northern Australia. The Commonwealth argued that the native title rights 
and interests being claimed in that case could not be recognized at com-
mon law based on their view that the common law did not extend beyond 
the low water mark. They further contended that the native title rights and 
interests claimed could not exist in the claim area because the Crown itself 
did not even hold radical title to the area in question. 
15. This section on international developments uses language such as “native title rights and 
interests” and “Maori customary lands” in order to reflect the Australian and New 
Zealand conceptions of Aboriginal title. American jurisprudence employs the term “Ab-
original title”, though it is to be noted that there remain differences between Canadian 
and US approaches to Aboriginal title. 
16. Commonwealth of Austraiia v. Yarmirr, (2001) 208 C.L.R. 1 [hereinafter Yarmirr]. 
17. Lardil Peoples v. State of Queensland, [2004] FCA 298 [hereinafter Lardil Peoples]. 
18. Native Title Act 1993, Act No. 110of 1993 [hereinafter Native Title Act]. Section 223 of 
the Act defines “native title” or “native title rights and interests” as the communal, group 
or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in rela-
tion to land or waters, where : the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional 
laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders ; and the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those 
laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters ; and the rights and inte-
rests are recognized by Australian common law. 
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The High Court ultimately found that the common law did extend be-
yond the low water mark, and thus it was theoretically possible to recog-
nize some native title rights and interests in the claim area19. In addition, 
the majority of the High Court found that the existence of underlying or 
radical Crown title in the claim area was not a necessary prerequisite for a 
finding of native title. According to the High Court, the common law could 
theoretically recognize, pursuant to s. 223 of the Native Title Act, native 
title rights and interests in relation to areas beyond the low water mark 
since native title rights and interests were said not to be created by, or to be 
derived from, the common law20. They went on to hold that the law relating 
to the territorial sea of Australia was not inconsistent with the common 
law of Australia recognizing native title rights and interests in relation to 
the sea or the seabed. 
However, they also found that the rights and interests that had been 
asserted at sovereignty carried the recognition of public rights of naviga-
tion and fishing, and perhaps, the concession of an international right of 
innocent passage. According to the Court, because of the inconsistency 
between the rights and interests asserted at sovereignty and the exclusive 
native title rights and interests being claimed by the appellants, those na-
tive title rights that could be recognized at common law could not be exclu-
sive in nature21. 
Thus, in Yarmirr the court found that the public rights of navigation 
and fishing, and the international right of innocent passage, came with the 
assertion of sovereignty by the Crown, and accordingly, held that the as-
sertion of sovereignty was fundamentally inconsistent with the continued 
existence of the exclusive native title rights and interests being claimed22. 
In turn, the Court found that it was only possible to recognize a form of 
non-exclusive native title in northern Australia’s sea and seabed. This said, 
even if the Court had reached a different conclusion with respect to the 
effect of these public and international rights, exclusive native title rights 
would likely not have been found in Yarmirr. This is because the High 
19. Yarmirr, supra, note 16, para. 34. 
20. Ibid., para. 48-50. 
21. Ibid., para. 61 and 76. 
II. According to the court, this inconsistency was of no dînerent quality than the inconsis-
tency that arises as a result of the exercise of a sovereign power, such as the granting of 
a fee simple estate, which, in Australia, has been recognized as having the ellect of extin-
guishing native title rights and interests : See Yarmirr, supra, note 16 at para. 100. 
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Court had upheld the primary judge’s ruling to the effect that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to establish that any exclusive right was 
part of the traditional laws and customs of the claimant Aboriginal group23. 
The Yarmirr case was followed in Lardil Peoples. In that case the 
Lardil, Yangkaal, Gangalidda and Kaiadilt peoples had brought an applica-
tion under the Native Title Act for a determination that native title exists in 
the seas around the Wellesley Islands and the mainland coast in the south-
ern Gulf of Carpentaria24. The Federal Court of Australia ultimately held 
that each of the applicant Aboriginal communities had certain native title 
rights and interests in the determination area, which included both inland 
and offshore land and water areas25. 
This said, the native title rights recognized by the Court were limited 
to rights of access for the purposes allowed by and under the traditional 
laws and customs of the claimant Aboriginal groups, rights to fish, hunt 
and gather living and plant resources, and rights to access the land and 
waters below the high water mark for the purposes allowed under tradi-
tional laws and customs for religious and spiritual purposes26. Importantly, 
the Court held that the native title rights and interests held by the claimants 
did not include possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the land and 
waters to the exclusion of all others, or rights or interests in minerals and 
petroleum in the determination area27. Further, the Court explicitly stated 
that those native title rights and interests must yield to other interests 
created by the Crown as well as the rights and interests of members of the 
public arising under the common law or applicable international law28 
23. Yarmirr, ibid., para. 88. 
24. See J. BEHRENDT, The Wellesley Sea Claim: An Overview, [Online], 2004, 
[www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/conf2004/papers/pdfs/JasonBehrendt.pdf] (February 2, 
2005) [hereinafter BEHRENDT]. 
25. Specifically, the Court held that the applicants had native title to the intertidal zone and 
adjoining seas for a distance of 5 nautical miles (nm) or 9.8 km from islands inhabited at 
sovereignty, a distance ranging from 2.7 nm to 5 nm on the mainland coast and a half 
nautical mile around other islands : see Lardil Peoples, supra, note 17, para. 245. 
26. Lardil Peoples, ibid. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid. For more information on the distinctions between Australian and Canadian law in 
relation to Aboriginal rights and title claims to water spaces and submerged lands, see 
J.I. REYNOLDS, Aboriginal Title to the Seabed: A Comparative Introduction, Ottawa, 
Pacific Business & Law Institute, 2003 [hereinafter REYNOLDS] and BROWN and 
REYNOLDS , supra, note 7. For present purposes it should be noted there is a blurring of 
the distinction between Aboriginal title and rights in Australia, and native title does not 
have the same level of protection in Australia as it does in Canada. For one, native title 
rights in Australia do not have constitutional protection given that there is no equivalent 
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1.2 New Zealand 
New Zealand has also recently dealt with claims to waters and sub-
merged lands. In Ngaii Apa et al. v. The Attorney General et al.29 the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal unanimously held that the Maori Land Court had 
jurisdiction to determine whether certain lands below the mean high water 
mark on the Marlborough Sounds were Maori customary lands30. In mak-
ing this determination, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the 
rights of non-Crown title holders to coastal lands below the high water 
mark were either incapable of existing at common law, or had been extin-
guished by statute. In addition, the Court dealt with the issue of whether 
Maori customary title could technically be found in those areas in which 
the Crown itself may not even possess underlying or radical title31. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal was based on preliminary and 
general questions of law, and cannot be taken to have established Maori 
customary land below the high water mark, or to have resolved issues con-
cerning the nature of any property interests in such lands. Rather, the ap-
peal only dealt with the initial question of whether the Maori Land Court 
could enter into a substantive inquiry with respect to claims for customary 
title32. This said, the Court’s reasoning is still interesting for present pur-
poses. 
to s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 in Australia. Lastly, both the Yarmirr, supra, note 
16, and Lardil Peoples, supra, note 17, cases were brought under the Native Title Act, 
supra, note 18, which defines native title as the communal, group or individual rights and 
interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters 
which are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional cus-
toms observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders. The test for native 
title in the Native Title Act appears to be a codification of the common law test articu-
lated in Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2], (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, which is primarily based on 
the pre-existing laws and customs of Aboriginal groups and Torres Strait Islanders, as 
distinct from its Canadian counterpart which is based on exclusive occupation at sove-
reignty. This, coupled with the fact that the Native Title Act itself contemplates the pos-
sibility of native title rights in relation to waters, could call into question the weight 
Canadian courts would accord Australian jurisprudence in this area. 
29. Ngaii Apa, Ngaii Koata, Ngaii Kuia, Ngaii Rarua, Ngaii Tama, Ngaii Toa and 
Rangttane And Anor v. The Attorney-General And Ors, (CA) CA173/01, [19 June 2003] 
Court of Appeal of New Zealand [hereinafter Ngaii Apa]. 
30. The five justices of the New Zealand Court of Appeal wrote four judgments, all of which 
reached the same result and provided similar reasoning. See in particular the judgment 
of Elias J., para. 90-91. 
31. Ngaii Apa, supra, note 29, para. 30. 
32. This point is stressed by bhas J., para. 8-9 of Ngaii Apa, ibid. 
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For one, it is worth noting that the Court held that the Maori Land 
Court had jurisdiction to consider a claim to Maori customary title to land 
below the high water mark. In other words, it did not dismiss the idea of 
customary title in these areas outright, or hold that such claims were not 
cognizable to the common law. In addition, in finding that the Maori Land 
Court had jurisdiction to consider these types of claims, the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal overturned their prior ruling in the Re Ninety-Mile Beach33 
case. In Re Ninety-Mile Beach it was held that the transmutation of cus-
tomary land bordering the sea into Maori freehold land extinguished cus-
tomary Maori interests over the foreshore and the seabed. The overturning 
of Re Ninety-Mile Beach by all justices of the Court of Appeal with the 
exception of the President of the Court arguably dissolved the previous 
assumption that there was no seaward Maori customary title in New 
Zealand34 
As an interesting side note, the Ngaii Apa decision was met with much 
resistance from both the members of the public and from the New Zealand 
government. The government of New Zealand introduced the Foreshore 
and Seabed Policy in August 2003 as a response to the decision of the Court 
of Appeal35. The policy essentially removes the ability of the Maori to go 
to the High Court or to the Maori Land Court for definition and declara-
tion of their legal rights in the foreshore and seabed. Instead, it endorses a 
regime that would recognize lesser and fewer Maori rights, and does so 
without a guarantee of compensation for the loss of those Maori customary 
rights, if any, which exist in the foreshore and the seabed. 
Maori across New Zealand expressed strong dissatisfaction with this 
policy, and a request was made to the Waitangi Tribunal for an urgent in-
quiry into the policy. The Waitangi Tribunal released its report on the 
policy on March 8, 200436. The tribunal fiercely criticized the policy, re-
commended its abandonment, and strongly urged the government to 
instead engage with the Maori in proper negotiations with respect to the 
33. Re Ninety-Mile Beach, [1963] N.Z.L.R. 461 [hereinafter Re Ninety-Mile Beach]. 
34. Brief of Evidence of Dr. Paul Gerard McHugh dated 13 January 2004, submitted to the 
Waitangi Tribunal, In the Matter of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and In the Matter 
of Applicaiions for an Urgent Inquiry into Foreshore and Seabed Issues, WAINo. 1071. 
35. Note that minor adjustments were made to this policy between August 2003 and Decem-
ber 2003, with the refined version being the subject of the January 2004 inquiry of the 
Waitangi Tribunal. 
36. Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, WAI 1071, Waitangi Tribunal 
Report, 2004 [hereinafter Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Crown’s Foreshore and Sea-
bed Policy]. 
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best way forward in this area. However, the Crown released a bill essen-
tially codifying its Foreshore and Seabed Policy on April 22, 200437, which 
was passed by the New Zealand legislature on November 18, 200438. 
1.3 United States 
A number of Aboriginal title cases have arisen in the United States 
with respect to both inland and offshore water spaces and submerged lands. 
For instance, in Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States^ 
an Aboriginal group sought to dispute the sovereignty of the United States 
to an area lying 3 to 65 miles offshore from Alaska, including the surface of 
the sea, the water column beneath it, the seabed, and the minerals lying 
underneath the seabed40. In addition to seeking injunctive relief to prevent 
the United States government and oil companies from interfering with their 
alleged rights, the claimants sought damages and a declaration of title to, 
and control over, the area41. The appellants mainly rested their suit on ex-
clusive use and occupancy of super-adjacent sea ice from time immemorial 
for subsistence hunting and fishing42. 
Rather than address the Aboriginal rights and title issues raised by the 
Inupiats, the Court decided the case on the basis of a series of decisions 
from the United States Supreme Court43 that held that the United States 
federal government had, as a matter of constitutional law, paramount rights 
in ocean waters lying seaward of the ordinary watermark44. In fact, it was 
not until the Village of Gambell v. Hodel and Native Village of Eyak v. 
37. The draft legislation is entitled the Foreshore and Seabed Bill, 129-1, [Online], 
[www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/home.cfm.] (January 28, 2005). 
38. Note that the whole of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, Public Act No. 093, came 
into force on January 17, 2005. The final legislation, as well as relevant press releases, 
can be found at the above mentioned New Zealand government site, supra, note 37. 
39. Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F Supp 182 at 185 (District 
of Alaska, 1982) ; 474 U.S. 820 (U.S.S.C.) October 7, 1985 certiorari denied [hereinafter 
Inupiat], 
40. REYNOLDS, supra, note 28 at 15. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid. 
43. U.S. v. California, 351 U.ï>. 19 (1947); U.S. v. Louisiana, 35v U.ï>. oyy, (19JU); U.S. v. 
Texas, 339 U.S. 7UI (1950); U.S. v. Maine, 420 U.5>. 5ID (19ID). 
44. Inupia,, supra, note 39 at 187. Note that the U .S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
rejected an appeal in the case, holding that any rights the Inupiat may have once had 
were extinguished by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. (1971). 
45. Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 K2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Gambell\. See 
also Amoco Produciion Co. v. Gambel,, 480 U.S. 531 (1987). 
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Trawler Diane Marie Inc.46 cases that Aboriginal rights and title issues in 
water spaces and submerged lands were squarely addressed in the United 
States jurisprudence47. 
In Gambell the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
stated that Aboriginal rights may exist concurrently with a paramount fed-
eral interest in the outer continental shelf without undermining that inter-
est48. However, the case solely dealt with non-exclusive assertions of 
Aboriginal subsistence rights, as opposed to exclusive Aboriginal title in 
the outer continental shelf of Alaska49. The court in that case clearly found 
that such rights were not precluded by the paramountcy doctrine or other-
wise extinguished by Congress, and remanded the case back to the district 
court for consideration as to whether, on the evidence, the village of 
Gambell and the other appellants to the case held such rights, and if so, 
whether the drilling activities undertaken by the oil companies significantly 
interfered with those rights50. 
The Eyak case involved a claim to unextinguished Aboriginal title to a 
portion of the outer continental shelf (OCS)51. The Court rejected the 
group’s claim to exclusive use and occupation of the OCS of the United 
States on the same grounds as in Inupiat, even in the face of evidence show-
ing that the group had hunted sea mammals and harvested the fishery res-
ources of the OCS for more than 7,000 years, and demonstrating that their 
continued social, cultural and economic well-being depended on their abil-
ity to hunt and fish in their traditional territories52. However, in a rare 
move, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
voted en banc to re-evaluate this decision53. In July 2004 the Ninth Circuit 
en banc panel handed down its order vacating the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendants, and remanded the case back to the 
district court with instructions to decide what Aboriginal rights to fish 
46. Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie Inc., 154 F.3d 1090 (1998) [hereinafter 
Eyak]. 
47. See D J . BLOCH, “Colonizing the Last Frontier”, (2004) 29, American Indian Law 
Review 1, [hereinafter BLOCH]. 
48. Gambel,, supra, note 45 at 1277 ; BLOCH, ibid. 
49. BLOCH, loc. cit,, note 47 at i /. 
50. wid. 
51. REYNOLDS, supra, note 28 at 16. 
52. Ibid. at 17. 
53. Eyak Native Village v. Daley, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS6671, No. 02-36155, United States 
, o r i r i / i w\ ff f , . 
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beyond the three mile limit, if any, the plaintiff Aboriginal group might 
have. Pursuant to the order, for purposes of this limited remand the district 
court was to assume that the villages’ Aboriginal rights, if any, had not been 
abrogated by the federal paramountcy doctrine or by other federal law54. 
Given the wording of this order it remains unclear whether Aboriginal title 
to areas of the offshore is within the realm of legal possibility in the United 
States, or whether the same is simply to be diminished in cases where there 
exists the potential for conflict between such title and federal para-
mountcy55. 
Lastly, in Idaho et. al. v. Cœur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho a federally 
recognized tribe brought an action against the state of Idaho, various state 
agencies, and numerous state officials in their individual capacities claim-
ing the beneficial interest, subject to the trusteeship of the United States, in 
the beds and banks of all navigable watercourses and waters within the 
original boundaries of the Cœur d’Alene reservation, and alternatively, 
ownership of the submerged lands pursuant to unextinguished Aboriginal 
title. In addition, the tribe sought a declaratory judgment to establish their 
entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy, and the right to quiet en-
joyment of, the submerged lands ; a declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho 
laws purporting to regulate the submerged lands ; and a preliminary and 
permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from taking actions in vio-
lation of their rights in these lands The United States Supreme Court ulti-
mately denied their claims on the basis that a grant of such rights would 
divest the State of Idaho of its sovereign control over submerged lands 
which were seen to be lands with a unique status in the law and infused 
with public trust which the state itself was bound to respect57 
54. The precise implications of this order vis-à-vis the 1998 decision in Eyak, supra, note 46, 
concerning the claim to unextinguished Aboriginal title to the outer continental shelf 
remain unclear at this time. 
55. See BLOCH, supra, note 47. 
56. Idaho v. Cœur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) [hereinafter Idaho]. 
57. Ibid. at 283. The origins of the concept of sovereign lands are stated in more detail in 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Utah Division State Lands v. United States 
et al., 107 S. Ct. 2318, in which Justice O’Connor discusses the history of sovereign 
ownership as follows at 2320 : “Under English law the English Crown held sovereign 
title to all lands underlying navigable waters. Because title to such land was important to 
the sovereign’s ability to control navigation, fishing and commercial activity on the riv-
ers and lakes, ownership of the land was considered an essential attribute of sovereignty. 
Title to such land therefore was vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole 
people.” 
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However, the United States Supreme Court later affirmed the Cœur 
d’Alene Tribe’s ownership of submerged lands on their reserve beneath the 
internal navigable waterway in Idaho v. United States8 by relying on treaty 
clauses, executive orders and congressional actions to overcome the pre-
sumption that the state of Idaho took title to all submerged lands when it 
joined the Union on an equal footing with the other states59. 
2 Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues 
The preceding review of international developments highlights some 
of the unique legal and evidentiary issues which courts in Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States have been asked to deal with in the course 
of considering Aboriginal title claims to inland and offshore water spaces 
and submerged lands. The remainder of this article will focus on how these 
issues could play out in the Canadian context. This will be done with refer-
ence to both s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Aboriginal title 
test set out by the SCC in Deegamuukw. 
2.1 Section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
Section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and affirms the 
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, 
and has as its underlying purpose the reconciliation of the pre-existence of 
Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown. As such, it serves 
as an essential tool in the consideration of all Aboriginal title claims 
because it provides the constitutional framework through which the fact 
58. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). 
59. For further information on US cases in this area, see REYNOLDS , supra, note 28 at 14-
18 ; BROWN and REYNOLDS , supra, note 7 ; and BLOCH , supra, note 47. Some of the cases 
not discussed in this section but worthy of note include Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. 
United States, 39 Ct. 40 (1918); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. (1908); U.S. v. 
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) ; Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th 
Cir. C.A., 1981); Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn,, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); People of 
Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F. 2d 572 (9th Cir., 1984). Note also that like Australia 
and New Zealand, the United States does not have any instrument equivalent to s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. In addition, James Reynolds has argued that when consider-
ing those American cases which have denied the claims brought by Aboriginal groups on 
the basis of the federal paramountcy doctrine one should keep in mind that Canada’s 
Oceans Act, supra, note 11, actually provides that the rights of Canada in its territorial 
sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf do not abrogate or derogate from 
any legal right held before February 4 1991 or any existing Aboriginal or treaty rights 
recognized under s. 35 of the Constitution Act 1982. On this last point see REYNOLDS 
supra note 28 at 18 in which he discusses sections 2.1 8 14 and 18 of the Oceans Act. 
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that Aboriginal peoples lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their 
own practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and is reconciled 
with the Crown’s sovereignty60. 
This underlying purpose of reconciliation may well require that the 
scope and content of any Aboriginal title rights recognized and affirmed 
pursuant to s. 35(1) be defined in light of the purpose of reconciliation. In 
turn, courts faced with Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and sub-
merged lands would seem to be required to take into account both the prior 
occupation of Aboriginal peoples and the sovereignty of the Crown when 
considering these claims, and to reconcile these two realities within the 
context of the current Canadian constitutional and legal structure, and 
within the broader social, political and economic community in which 
Aboriginal societies exist, and over which the Crown is sovereign61. This 
could translate into a need to allow the principle of reconciliation to shape 
the application of the Aboriginal title test, and in turn, the nature, content 
and scope of any Aboriginal title rights found pursuant to that test. 
Some insight into how the principle of reconciliation factors into the 
Aboriginal title analysis was provided by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw. Ac-
cording to the learned Chief Justice, reconciliation requires that in the 
course of considering an Aboriginal title claim account be taken of both 
Aboriginal and common law perspectives, and that equal weight be placed 
on each62. In addition, cases such as Van der Peet63, Delgamuukw64, 
Mitchell65 and Gladstone66 can be taken for the proposition that Aboriginal 
rights and title only survived the assertion of Crown sovereignty to the 
extent they were not incompatible with this sovereignty, or were cognizable 
to, or did not otherwise strain, the Canadian legal and constitutional struc-
ture. To state it differently, it seems clear from these cases that part of rec-
onciling the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of 
60. Van der Peet, supra, note 2, para. 31 and 43. See also : R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 
1075 at 1109 [hereinafter Sparrow] ; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, para. 73 [here-
inafter Gladstone] ; Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, para. 81,148, 161,165 and 186 ; Mitchell 
v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, para. 12, 174, 155 and 164 [hereinafter Miichell]. 
61. See Van der Peet, supra, note 2 at para. 31, 43 ; Mitchel,, ibid., para. 74, 155 and 164 (per 
Binnie J.) ; Gladstone, ibid., para. 73. 
62. Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, para. 148. 
63. Van der Peet, supra, note 2, para. 49. 
64. Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, para. ti2. 
to. Mitchel,, supra, note 60, para. 141 and IJU (perBinme J.;. JNote mat Binme J sopimonin 
Mitchell was a concurrence. The majority judgment expressly stopped short of endors-
ing the notion of sovereign incompatibility. 
DO. Lriadstone, supra, note ou, para. 67 and /u. 
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the Crown is determining whether the rights being claimed by an Aborigi-
nal group can be recognized within the current Canadian legal and consti-
tutional structure, and whether these rights would be compatible with the 
continued exercise of Crown sovereignty. 
2.2 Aboriginal Title Test 
As discussed above, in Delgamuukw Lamer C.J. stated that in order to 
make out a claim to Aboriginal title a claimant group must be able to 
demonstrate they were in exclusive occupation of land at sovereignty and, 
at least in cases where they rely on present occupation as proof of pre-
sovereignty occupation, they must show continuity between pre-sover-
eignty and present occupation67. It is clear both from the manner in which 
this test is set out in Delgamuukw, and the particular facts of that case, that 
the test was not specifically designed to deal with claims to water spaces 
and submerged lands. In turn, the various components of this test present 
interesting legal and evidentiary issues when applied outside of the “dry 
land” context. 
2.2.1 Sovereignty 
As seen above, an Aboriginal group asserting Aboriginal title must 
establish exclusive occupation of the lands in question at the time the 
Crown asserted sovereignty over these lands68. While this statement ap-
pears relatively unambiguous it must be noted that in discussing the sover-
eignty component of the Aboriginal title test, Lamer C.J. did not fully 
explain what he meant by “sovereignty” in this context. In addition, he went 
on to introduce three different stages of sovereignty : the “assertion of sov-
ereignty”, the generic term “sovereignty”, and the “conclusive establish-
ment of sovereignty”, using these different concepts interchangeably 
throughout his reasons69. In addition, Lamer C.J. did not clearly articulate 
67. The test is set out in Delgamuukw, supra, note 3 at para 143, as follows : “In order to 
make out a claim for aboriginal title, the aboriginal group asserting title must satisfy the 
following criteria : (i) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty ; (ii) if 
present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a 
continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation ; and (iii) at sovereignty, that 
occupation must have been exclusive.” 
68. Ibid., at para. 143-145. 
69. See for instance para. 144 of Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, where Lamer CJ . states that 
“the aboriginal group asserting the claim must establish that it occupied the lands in 
question at the time at which the Crown asserted sovereignty” as compared to the dis-
cussion at para. 145 where Lamer CJ . employs the generic term sovereignty, and then 
proceeds to speak of sovereignty over British Columbia being “conclusively established 
by the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846”. 
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how “sovereignty”, in all of its stages, is to be established. Until the SCC 
revisits the sovereignty question it will remain unclear whether an asser-
tion of sovereignty, or some other stage of sovereignty, represents the rel-
evant time period for purposes of assessing Aboriginal title claims. In 
addition, questions will remain as to the precise indicia which our courts 
will accept as proof of this sovereignty. 
Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged lands, particu-
larly in the offshore context, add another level of uncertainty with respect 
to this aspect of the Aboriginal title test. Principles regarding ownership, 
jurisdiction and delineation of offshore maritime zones did not develop 
until the late 1800s and early 1900s. As one example, it was only in the late 
1920s that legislation made explicit reference to Canada’s territorial sea70, 
and only in 1970 that Canada’s territorial sea was extended to 12 miles by 
way of legislation71. Given this, it is presently difficult to predict how courts 
will arrive at their findings with respect to the appropriate time period to 
be used in assessing Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged 
lands, and in turn, how they will arrive at their conclusions with respect to 
Aboriginal title in these areas. 
2.2.2 Exclusive Occupation 
Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged lands also pose 
significant hurdles in terms of proof of exclusive occupation. As seen ear-
lier, according to Delgamuukw an Aboriginal group must prove they exclu-
sively occupied the area subject to their claim at sovereignty in order to 
establish Aboriginal title. At present much debate persists as to how an 
Aboriginal group would actually meet the criteria of exclusive occupation 
70. An Act to Amend the Customs Act (1928), 18 & 19 Geo. V., c. 16, s. 1 (Can.). 
71. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C. 1970. Note that it was not until the mid 
1960s that Canadian legislation, in the form of Canada’s Territorial Sea and Fishing 
Zones Act, S.C. 1964-65, 13 Elizabeth II, c. 22, explicitly provided for a three nautical 
mile territorial sea of Canada. Note also that Canada only explicitly claimed ownership 
and jurisdiction over the 12 nautical mile territorial sea in 1990 by way of the Canadian 
Laws Offshore Applicaiion Act, S.C. 1990, c. 44, and that it was not until 1996 that this 
assertion was made through the explicit statutory language of the Oceans Act, supra, 
note 11. Pursuant to s. 8 of the Oceans Act Canada claims “ownership” of this 12 nauti-
cal mile territorial sea. See also article 3 of the United Nations Conveniion on the Law of 
the Sea, Montego Bay, Dec. 10 1982 [in force Nov. 14 1994, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 
(1982)], 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Canada ratified UNCLOS November 7, 
2003. 
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when title is claimed in relation to “dry land”72. Aboriginal title claims to 
water spaces and submerged lands are likely to lead to further complexi-
ties in this area since those indicators of exclusive occupation one might 
expect to see in Aboriginal title cases may be largely absent in this context. 
This said, it is certainly acknowledged that we do have some guidance 
from the courts as to how an Aboriginal group would establish exclusive 
occupation under the Aboriginal title test. As mentioned towards the be-
ginning of this article, in Delgamuukw Lamer C.J. stated that in determin-
ing whether there is sufficient exclusive occupation at sovereignty for a 
finding of Aboriginal title the courts are to have regard to both common 
law and Aboriginal perspectives relating to occupation and exclusivity73. 
According to the learned Chief Justice, Aboriginal perspectives in relation 
to exclusive occupation may be gleaned, in part, from Aboriginal land ten-
ure systems or laws governing land use74. 
As regards the role of the common law in this context, Lamer C.J. 
stated that Professor Kent McNeil has convincingly argued that the fact of 
physical occupation is proof of possession at common law, which in turn 
will ground title to land75. According to Lamer C.J., the common law per-
spective in relation to occupation may be evidenced in a variety of ways, 
including construction of dwellings, cultivation and enclosure of fields, and 
regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise ex-
ploiting resources76. He further stated that in making a determination with 
respect to occupation, a court may consider such things as the Aboriginal 
group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, 
as well as the character of the lands claimed77. 
72. For instance, this is evident from the R. v. Bernard, 2003 N.B.C.A. 55 [hereinafter Ber-
nard], and R. v. Marshal,, 2003 N.S.C.A. 105 [hereinafter Marshall], decisions out of the 
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Courts of Appeal respectively. For a synopsis of the 
manner in which such issues were dealt with in Marshal,, supra, see MOODIE, supra, 
note 7 at para. 42-50. 
73. See Delgamuukw, supra, note 3 at para. 147-149. 
74. Ibid. 
ID. laid. at para. 149. 
lb. laid. JNote that here Lamer CJ . appears to rely heavily on, among other things, the work 
of K. M C N E I L , Common Law Aboriginal T Me, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989 [hereinaf-
ter Common Law Aboriginal Title\, 73, 201-202. 
77. Delgamuukw, ibid. Note here that Lamer CJ . cites B. SLATTERY Understanding Ab-
original Rights , (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. Ill for this proposition. 
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With regards to exclusivity, Lamer C.J. explained that the test to es-
tablish exclusive occupation must take into account the Aboriginal society 
at the time of sovereignty78. He also contemplated the possibility of joint 
Aboriginal title, stating that instances of trespass or the sharing of claimed 
lands at sovereignty would not necessary preclude a finding of exclusive 
occupation so long as the group claiming title could show that they had an 
intention and capacity to retain exclusive control79. 
This said, a number of questions with respect to this component of the 
Aboriginal title test remain. For one, until such time as the SCC revisits the 
test for Aboriginal title it will likely remain unclear as to how precisely the 
courts are to give equal weight to common law and Aboriginal perspectives 
in relation to occupation and exclusivity80. It is unclear whether this will 
require courts to simply take evidence of exclusive occupation at both com-
mon law and pursuant to Aboriginal laws and perspectives into account, 
whether claimant Aboriginal groups will be required to prove exclusive 
occupation under both systems, or whether the courts are to arrive at a 
standard of occupation representing the middle ground between these two 
systems. In addition, until the SCC is faced with another Aboriginal title 
claim we will lack clear and definitive guidance with respect to the precise 
types of evidence that would tend to demonstrate exclusive occupation at 
common law and pursuant to Aboriginal perspectives. In addition, it will 
remain unclear whether the burden will be on Aboriginal groups to demon-
strate they used and occupied their lands at sovereignty to the exclusion of 
all others, or simply to the exclusion of other Aboriginal groups. 
It goes without saying that these outstanding issues will present ex-
ceptional challenges in cases where Aboriginal title is claimed to water 
78. Delgamuulcw, ibid. at para. 156. 
79. Ibid. at para. 155-158. 
80. Some examples of how both common law and Aboriginal perspectives relating to exclu-
sivity and occupation could play out in the context of Aboriginal title claims to water 
spaces and submerged lands are found in the Australian jurisprudence in this area. As 
stated earlier, such jurisprudence must be approached with caution given the differences 
between the Canadian and Australian approaches of Aboriginal title issues. This said, it 
is at least interesting to look to the reasons given in the Lardil Peoples, supra, note 17, 
and Yarmirr, supra, note 16, cases. In particular, see Justice Cooper’s treatment of Ab-
original perspectives in relation to ownership (at para. 147), Aboriginal land tenure sys-
tems (para. 75, 105) and exclusivity (para. 113, 152) in Lardil Peoples, as discussed in 
BEHRENDT, supra, note 24 at 12-13. See also Kirby J.J.’s reasons at para. 304-317 of 
Yarmirr with respect to the standards of occupation and exclusivity, and the role of the 
claimant group’s connection with the land in Aboriginal title cases under the Australian 
Native Title Act, supra, note 18. 
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spaces and submerged lands81. Where Aboriginal groups claim areas such 
as the territorial sea of Canada, the Great Lakes or the St. Lawrence Sea-
way it may well be that the indicators of exclusive occupation one might 
expect to see in Aboriginal title cases would be largely absent. How would 
an Aboriginal group show that they exclusively occupied areas known to 
be our great highways of trade and commerce ? Would the existence of 
Aboriginal trespass laws constitute sufficient evidence of an “intention and 
capacity” to retain exclusive control so as to support a claim of exclusive 
occupation82 ? Would Aboriginal groups have to demonstrate that they 
physically used and occupied the submerged lands in question through the 
erection of permanent structures (e.g. wharfs, docks, piers) or through use 
of these lands for activities such as the gathering of shellfish, seaweed, and 
kelp ? Would these groups be able to meet the test set out in Deegamuukw 
by simply demonstrating that they occupied the areas subject to their 
claims to the extent “reasonably possible” by engaging in fishing, naviga-
tion and spiritual activities ? Or would a higher standard of occupation 
apply — at least in those cases where title is claimed in relation to special 
areas such as the foreshore and the seabed83 ? In addition, one might ask 
whether courts would view evidence of exclusive occupation of particular 
offshore and inland areas (e.g. fishing sites) as being representative of 
exclusive occupation of the whole area being claimed by the Aboriginal title 
claimants, and whether a finding of Aboriginal title to a vast area of “dry 
81. On this point see BROWN and REYNOLDS, supra, note 7 at para. 18-21, and MOODIE, 
supra, note 7 at para. 58-81, where he considers how the Delgamuukw Aboriginal title 
test might apply outside of the “dry land” context, and devotes particular attention to the 
Haida Nation action seeking, among other things, Aboriginal title to maritime areas ad-
jacent to the Queen Charlotte Islands. 
82. See Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, para. 157. 
83. See Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra, note 76 at 104-105, where McNeil states : “But 
the foreshore and seabed are different because, except where a pier, retaining wall or the 
like is built, they cannot be occupied in the same way as other lands. More commonly 
they are unoccupied, and probably always have been, and are therefore presumed to 
have remained in the original occupation of the Crown, which extends to all waste lands 
that have never been held by subjects. Furthermore there are important public rights of 
navigation and fishing over tidal and coastal waters that need to be protected. Conse-
quently, the ownership of the Crown is for the benefit of the subject. The existence of 
these rights also excludes to a large extent the possibility of exclusive occupation of the 
underlying lands.” Though McNeil does not specifically deal with the issue of Aboriginal 
title in relation to the foreshore or seabed he does seem to imply that given the excep-
tional character of these lands, long presumed to have remained in the original occupa-
tion of the Crown and subject to common law rights or fishing and navigation, they would 
pose significant evidential challenges in terms of proof of exclusive occupation generally. 
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land” would be seen as necessarily conferring title to the natural resources, 
including the waters, minerals, marine life and waterbeds, within the claim 
area84 ? 
These questions serve to highlight once more the need for clarity with 
respect to the manner in which common law and Aboriginal perspectives 
should factor into Aboriginal title determinations. It is likely that Aborigi-
nal understandings and laws in relation to their traditional lands would take 
on great importance in the context of Aboriginal title claims to water spaces 
and submerged lands given that the physical indicators of exclusive occu-
pation may not be readily available in these particular types of claims. 
The compartmentalization of interests relating to lands and waters is 
not generally characteristic of Aboriginal understandings of land tenure. In 
fact, many Aboriginal groups define their relationship to their traditional 
territories as one of stewardship based on an understanding of responsi-
bilities flowing from their special relationship with these territories as op-
posed to rights arising from this relationship85. A more holistic concept of 
84. See K. M C N E I L , Emerging Justice ? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Aus-
tralia, Saskatoon, Native Law Centre of University of Saskatchewan, 2001, at 115. It 
should also be noted here that the common law provides that a riparian land owner owns 
the bed of non-tidal waters and non-navigable waters to the center line by virtue of the 
rebuttable presumption of ad medium fHum aquae. However, this principle does not 
apply uniformly across Canada in the case of navigable waters. See : G.V. LAFOREST, 
Water Law in Canada : The Atlaniic Provinces, Ottawa, Department of Regional Eco-
nomic Expansion, 1973 ; Keewaiin Power Co. v. Town of Kenora, (1908) 16 O.L.R. 184 
(C.A.) reversing (1906), 13 O.L.R. 237 (H.C.) ; Friends of the Oldman River Society v. 
Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 ; R. v. Lewis, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 131 
(S.C.C.) ; R. v. Nikal, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 178 (S.C.C.). Lastly, it is interesting to note that 
in New Zealand Tamihana Korokai v. Solicitor Genera,, (1912) 15 G.L.R. 95; (32 
N.Z.L.R. 321) the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the Native Land Court has 
jurisdiction to entertain and determine whether any piece of land is Maori customary 
land and in ascertaining this it may determine whether or not the Maori were the owners 
of the bed of any lake or part thereof according to Maori custom or whether they had 
merely aright to fish in its waters In 1918 the Native Land Court vested fee simple title 
to Lake Waikaremona in the Maori The Crown appealed this decision (1944) 
8 Wellington A C M B 30) but the Native Appellate Court ultimatelv affirmed the grant-
ing of title in the lakebed to the Maori : Seethe Waitan si Tribunal Revort on the Crown’s 
Foreshore and Seabed Policy supra note 36 at 101 
85. For an excellent discussion on this topic, see OR. BROWN, Starboard or Port Tack? 
Navigaiing a Course to Recognition and Reconciliation of Aboriginal Title to Ocean 
Spaces, Master’s thesis, British Columbia, University of British Columbia, 1999 at 65-76 
[hereinafter BROWN], in which she discusses Haida Nation and Tsawwassen First Na-
tion understandings of their interests in lands and territories based on the results of her 
extensive field research in this area. 
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territoriality also figures prominently in many Aboriginal cultures, who 
often view their traditional territories as including elements of water, air, 
land and resources, and who incorporate principles of ownership, control 
and jurisdiction based on the need to protect and sustain the environment 
and its resources86. Given this, we are likely to require further guidance 
with respect to the manner in which we are to reconcile the common law’s 
compartmentalization of principles in relation to land and water87 and its 
emphasis on individual entitlements to exclusive use and enjoyment of 
land88 with the more holistic approach adopted by many Aboriginal groups 
in Canada. 
Before moving on, it is worth noting that the SCC could decide to give 
further clarity with respect to some of these issues in the course of rende-
ring its reasons in the Bernard and Marshall cases heard by the Court on 
January 17, 200589. While the main issues in both cases arise in the treaty 
context, the cases also raise interesting Aboriginal title issues, particularly 
in relation to the requirement of exclusive occupation90. Should the Court 
86 See BROWN, ibid. at 69 and 71, in which she discusses the HaidaNation and Tsawwassen 
First Nation understandings of “ownership” and “territoriality”. 
87. For instance, it is worth noting here that at common law, flowing water is incapable of 
ownership, and property in the context of water refers to the bundle of rights comprising 
the right to control the use and flow, diversion, extraction and sale of water, rather than 
the water itself. See further : W. BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
t. 2 London, University of Chicago, 1979, 18 ; Anger and Honsberge,, supra, note 10 at 
962. 
88. See BROWN, supra, note 85 at 75. 
89. For a synopsis of Cromwell J.’s judgment in Marshal,, supra, note 72, see MOODIE, 
supra, note 7 at para. 42. 
90. For instance, in his reasons in Bernard, supra, note 72, Justice Daigle stated at para. 90 
that the Aboriginal title test is highly contextual, and that the occupation requirement 
varies with the particular perspectives, habits and modes of life of each claimant 
Aboriginal group. According to the learned Justice, there is no requirement to prove in-
tensive, regular of physical use or every narrowly confined area within a claimed terri-
tory where, for instance, the Aboriginal group claiming title is a hunting and gathering 
community and has traditionally occupied the lands in a manner reflective of their semi-
nomadic way of life. He also stated, at para. 173-175, that the test for exclusive occupa-
tion focuses solely on the presence of other Aboriginal groups in the lands subject to the 
title claim. In Marshal,, supra, note 72, Justice Cromwell stated at para. 153 that the 
standard of occupation to be used in Aboriginal title determinations is the third standard 
advanced by Kent McNeil in Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra, note 76. This stan-
dard represents the middle ground between the minimal occupation that would permit a 
person to sue a wrongdoer in trespass and the most onerous standard required to ground 
title by adverse possession. Under this standard physical acts relied on as proof of 
occupation would have to be considered in light of the nature of the land and the 
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choose to deal with these Aboriginal title issues their pronouncements with 
respect to the Aboriginal title test generally could have implications for 
cases relating to water spaces and submerged lands. 
2.2.3 Continuity 
Another problematic issue arising from the application of the Aborigi-
nal title test in cases where title is claimed to water spaces and submerged 
lands relates to the issue of continuity. In setting out the test for proof of 
Aboriginal title Lamer C.J. recognized that proof of exclusive occupation 
at sovereignty may be difficult to come by, and accordingly provided that 
an Aboriginal group may rely on present occupation as proof of pre-
sovereignty occupation if they can show, in addition, continuity between 
pre-sovereignty and present occupation91. However, the precise role of the 
principle of continuity is less clear where there is no reliance on present 
occupation92. In those cases where Aboriginal groups have sufficient evi-
dence of exclusive occupation at sovereignty, it will have to be determined 
whether they will still be under an obligation to demonstrate that they re-
mained in continuous occupation of their claimed lands over time, or man-
aged to maintain a substantial connection with these lands from 
pre-sovereignty to the present. 
Since many navigable water bodies and offshore areas have been used 
by members of the public for fishing, navigation, shipping and recreation 
for centuries one might expect that an Aboriginal group would have more 
difficulty making out an Aboriginal title claim to these areas if they would 
purposes for which it could be reasonably used. Further, this standard would not require 
evidence of intensive, regular use of the entire area subject to the Aboriginal title claim. 
Rather, the question would be whether the acts of occupation in particular areas show 
the whole area was occupied : Marshal,, supra, note 72 at para. 138. 
91. Delgamuukw, supra, note 3 at para. 143, 152-154. 
92. The present state of uncertainty in this area arises, in part, from the apparent inconsis-
tency between Lamer C.J.’s reasons in Delgamuukw, supra, note 3 at para. 143, 152-154, 
which imply that continuity need only be shown where reliance is placed on present 
occupation, and those reasons found at para. 150-151 of his judgment. For instance, at 
para. 151 Lamer C.J. states that “any land that was occupied pre-sovereignty, and which 
the parties have maintained a substantial connection with since then, is sufficiently im-
portant to be of central significance to the culture of the claimants”. This passage seems 
to imply that exclusive pre-sovereignty occupation is not sufficient for proof of Aborigi-
nal title what is required in addition is proof of the maintenance of a substantial connec-
tion between the Aboriginal group and the land over time. In addition, a number of 
references to the important role of continuity are found elsewhere in both the reasons of 
Lamer C.J. (para. 83, 126-128, 131, 154) and LaForest J. (para. 190, 193, 195-199), and 
these references do not solely focus on the “present occupation scenario”. 
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always have to satisfy the continuity component of the Aboriginal title 
test93. Once more, it remains to be seen whether the SCC will provide us 
with further guidance in this area in the course of rendering its decision in 
the aforementioned Bernard and Marshall cases94. 
3 Beyond the Aboriginal Title Test 
The above discussion highlights some of the practical legal and evi-
dentiary issues which may arise in the course of applying the test set out in 
Delgamuukw outside of the “dry land” context. Before concluding our dis-
cussion in relation to Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged 
lands it is important to canvass some additional issues that may arise where 
Aboriginal title is claimed in offshore and inland water areas. 
3.1 Reach of the Common Law 
One of the issues the courts will be faced with in the context of off-
shore Aboriginal title claims is whether the common law actually applies in 
those areas where Aboriginal title is being claimed, and if so, whether it 
works to recognize property-type rights in these areas such that a finding 
of Aboriginal title might be at least theoretically possible. If Aboriginal title 
claims extend into areas where the common law does not apply, courts may 
well be faced with determining which system of law would apply in its 
place. Possibilities might include international law or Aboriginal laws and 
customs. Further, it may fall on our courts to decide whether s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 has application in areas far into the offshore, such 
as the exclusive economic zone. 
To date, the courts and legislatures have provided us with some guid-
ance with respect to the territorial reach of the common law. The matter 
was considered in the English case R. v. Keyn95, which the SCC established 
93. For further information in relation to the implications of the doctrine of continuity in the 
area of Aboriginal title to water spaces and submerged lands, and the other components 
of the Aboriginal title test in this context, see K.J. TYLER, The Division of Powers and 
Aboriginal Water Rights Issues, Toronto, National Symposium on Water Law, Envi-
ronmental Law CLE Program, 1999 [hereinafter TYLER]. 
94. In Marshal,, supra, note 72, Cromwell J.A. stated at para. 181 that “continuity of occu-
pation from sovereignty to present is not part of the test for aboriginal title if exclusive 
occupation at sovereignty is established by direct evidence of occupation before and at 
the time of sovereignty”. Daigle J.A. took this same approach to this issue at para. 58 of 
Bernard, supra, note 72. 
95. R. v. Keyn, (1876) 2 Ex. D. 63 ; 46 LJ.M.C. 17 (Court of Crown Cases Reversed) [here-
inafter Keyn]. The case concerned a collision between two ships within three miles of 
the English coast of Dover, resulting in a loss of life. The accused, a German national, 
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as good law in Canada in Reference re : Ownership of Off Shore Mineral 
Rights66 and Reference re : Ownership of the Bed of the Straight of Geor-
gia97. In these two references Keyn was interpreted as standing for the 
proposition that the common law does not extend to areas beyond the low 
water mark unless explicitly extended to cover such areas through legisla-
tion. Interestingly, debates persist with respect to when this might have 
occurred in the case of Canada’s offshore. As seen earlier in relation to the 
sovereignty aspect of the Aboriginal title test, legislation explicitly extend-
ing Canada’s realm beyond low water mark is of relatively recent vintage. 
In addition, even though this legislative gap has now been largely remedied, 
there are some maritime zones in which Canada only holds “sovereign 
rights98” as opposed to ownership rights by virtue of instruments such as 
the United Nations Conveniion on the Law of the Sea and the Oceans Act 
In turn questions remain as to whether these instruments fall short of “ex-
tending Canada’s realm” such that the common law would apply in these 
areas" 
3.2 Underlying Crown Title 
According to Delgamuukw, Aboriginal title constitutes a burden on the 
Crown’s underlying title. However, the Crown did not acquire this title 
until it asserted sovereignty over Canada, and as such, Aboriginal title only 
was in command of a ship named the Franconia that was passing through these waters 
en route to a foreign port. He was indicted for manslaughter before the Central Criminal 
Court, and argued that the English Criminal Courts lacked jurisdiction over an offence 
committed out of the United Kingdom by a foreigner on board a foreign ship. By a 7 :6 
majority the Court in Keyn held that the English courts did not have jurisdiction over the 
offence. 
96. Reference re : Ownership of Off Shore Mineral Rights (British Columbia), [1967] S.C.R. 
792 [hereinafter Reference re : Ownership of Off Shore Mineral Rights]. 
97. Reference re : Ownership of the Bed of the Straight of Georgia and related areas, [1984] 
1 S.C.R. 388 [hereinafter Reference re : Ownership of the Bed of the Straight of Geor-
gia]. 
98. For instance, by virtue of s. 14 of the 1996 Oceans Act, supra, note 11, Canada claimed 
jurisdiction and sovereign rights, including exploration, exploitation, conservation and 
management of natural resources, to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. These 
rights, however, do not include ownership of this maritime zone. 
99. As noted above, the judgment in Yarmirr, supra, note 16, may be worth reviewing in this 
context. However, it is acknowledged here that not all of the judges of the Australian 
High Court were in accord with the principle that Aboriginal title could be recognized in 
areas beyond the low water mark. See in particular the reasons of McHugh J. at para. 
104-105 of the decision. 
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crystallized at the time this sovereignty was asserted by the Crown100. The 
notion that Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title may 
well become a major issue in the offshore context, at least in those cases 
where Aboriginal groups claim title to areas where the Crown itself does 
not even hold title. In such cases the court may be asked to decide whether 
the underlying Crown title is a “necessary prerequisite” for a finding of 
Aboriginal title. 
Interestingly, the courts in both Australia and New Zealand addressed 
this issue in the course of providing their reasons in the Yarmirr and Ngati 
Apa cases, discussed above. In Yarmirr the Australian High Court stated 
that it is of the very first importance to bear steadily in mind that native 
title rights and interests are not created by and do not derive from the com-
mon law, and therefore the existence of Crown radical title is not a neces-
sary prerequisite to the conclusion that native title rights and interests 
exist101. A similar understanding of the role of underlying or radical Crown 
title seems to have been adopted by Elias C.J. in the Ngaii Apa case. Ac-
cording to the learned justice, the radical title of the Crown is merely a 
“technical and notional concept102”. Given Lamer C.J.’s statements to the 
effect that Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title, and 
accordingly only actually “crystallizes” at sovereignty, it is unclear whether 
Canadian courts would reach similar conclusions in this regard. 
3.3 Public and International Rights 
Aboriginal title claims to areas such as the foreshore, the sea and the 
seabed raise questions with respect to the interplay between the nature and 
content of the Aboriginal title claimed by Aboriginal groups, and the rights 
held by the public in offshore areas. As seen from the above review of in-
ternational developments, courts dealing with Aboriginal title claims to 
offshore areas may be required to consider whether Aboriginal groups 
would be able to exclusively use and occupy water spaces and submerged 
100. Delgammulcw, supra, note 3 at para. 145. 
101. Yarmirr, supra, note 16 at para. 48-49. 
102. Ngaii Apa, supra, note 29 at para. JO. 
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lands in the face of competing common law public rights of navigation103 
and fishing104, as well as international rights of innocent passage. 
It will be recalled that in Yarmirr the Australian High Court dismissed 
the argument of the Aboriginal claimants that they should have exclusive 
rights to the seas and the seabed on the basis of their finding that there was 
a “fundamental inconsistency” between the asserted Aboriginal title rights 
and interests, and the common law rights of navigation and fishing, as well 
as the right of innocent passage105. Whether Canadian courts will take a 
similar approach to this issue is difficult to predict106. However, we do have 
some insight as to the manner in which our courts might deal with issues 
relating to the interplay between Aboriginal rights and common law public 
rights. 
As mentioned earlier, certain passages in Van der Peet107, 
Delgamuukwm', Mitchell109 and Gladstone110 can be taken as standing for 
the proposition that Aboriginal rights only survived the assertion of Crown 
103. Public rights of navigation apply to all waterways in Canada that are in fact navigable, 
and prevail over rights of riparian owners, rights of the owners of the bed, and public 
rights of fishing. According to Anger and Honsberger it is a question of fact whether 
waters are navigable which must be determined by an examination of all the circum-
stances. The essential question to be determined here is whether a waterway is “capable 
of navigation”. The test for navigability focuses on the utility of the waterway for com-
mercial purposes which may be regarded as being generally and commonly useful for 
some purpose of trade, agriculture or transportation in some practical and profitable 
manner. Further, the focus is not on the actual use of the waterway for navigation but 
rather the adaptability or capability of the waterway for purposes of navigation : see 
Anger and Honsberge,, supra, note 10 at 990. It should also be noted here that there is a 
public right to navigate over the foreshore itself, as well as ancillary rights such as an-
choring and mooring : (at 998-999). 
104. There is a public right to fish in all tidal waters up to the point where the tide ebbs and 
flows : Anger and Honsberge,, ibid. at 996. 
105. Yarmirr, supra, note 16 at para. 98 and 100. 
106. This is particularly so in light of the differences between Canadian and Australian ap-
proaches to Aboriginal law. As stated earlier, Australia does not have an equivalent to s. 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and as such, Aboriginal rights may not be accorded the 
same level of protection in Australia as they are in Canada. In addition, Aboriginal groups 
in Canada may well attempt to rely on the reconciliation imperative in s. 35 in order to 
argue that any potential Aboriginal title rights to submerged lands must be reconciled 
with common law and international rights in a manner which allows for the recognition 
of these title rights, perhaps subject to some necessary limitations. 
107. See Van der Peet, supra, note 2 at para. 49. 
108. Delgamuukw, supra, note 3 at para. 82. 
luv. ï>ee Binme J. in Mitchel,, supra, note ou at para. 141 and lju. 
. P , 
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sovereignty to the extent they were not incompatible with this sovereignty, 
or to the extent they were cognizable to, or otherwise did not strain, the 
Canadian legal and constitutional structure. In addition, in the Gladstone 
case the SCC stated that the elevation of Aboriginal rights to constitutional 
status was surely not intended to extinguish longstanding common law 
public rights of fishing111. 
This said, the Court in Gladstone went on to contemplate the possibil-
ity of such rights falling second in priority to Aboriginal rights in certain 
instances112. Such a conclusion makes sense in those cases where a court 
would be faced with balancing Aboriginal fishing rights with public rights 
of fishing, as was the case in Gladstone. However, whether or not public 
and international rights could actually co-exist with the exclusive use and 
occupation of offshore and inland water spaces and submerged lands seems 
to be a different issue which will likely require further consideration in the 
future113. 
In addition to the above, the existence of common law public rights 
and international rights of innocent passage might also signal evidentiary 
difficulties in terms of proof of Aboriginal title. It is reasonable to suppose 
that a court would at least consider the fact of these longstanding rights in 
111. Ibid. at para. 68. 
112. Ibid. 
113. Outside of the Aboriginal title context a series of English and Canadian cases have found 
private property rights in geographically limited foreshore and near-tidal areas, and in 
the beds of navigable waterways - though these rights have been subject to common law 
rights of fishing and navigation. See for instance : Nickerson v.AG Canada, [2000] N.S.J. 
No. 176 (N.S.S.C.) ; AG Canada v. Acadia Forest Products, (1987) 41 D.L.R. (4th) 338 
(F.C.A.) ; Tweedie v. The King, (1915) 52 S.C.R. 197 ; Lord Advocate v. Young, (1887) 12 
App. Cas. 544 (H.L. (S.C.)); The Queen v. Lord, (1864) 1 P.E.I. 245; Brown v. Reed, 
(1874) 15 N.B.R. 206. See also M.D. WALTERS, “Aboriginal Rights, Magna Carta and 
Exclusive Rights to Fisheries in the Waters of Upper Canada”, (1998) 23 Queen's L.J. 
301. It is also worth noting those US cases in which an inconsistency had been alleged 
between the claimed rights of Aboriginal claimants and the rights and interests of others 
in the area subject to the claim. In these cases it was held that the retention of the tradi-
tional laws and customs of the claimant groups was to be determined in each case by 
balancing the respective interests and by upholding these traditional native rights (in 
these cases the rights of native Hawaiians to enter undeveloped lands owned by others 
to practice continuously exercised access and gathering rights necessary for subsistence, 
cultural or religious purposes) so long as no actual harm was done by the practice. See : 
Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P. 2d 745 (1982) ; Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 837 P. 2d 
1247 (1992); Public Access Shoreiine Hawaii (PASH) v. Hawa’ii County Planning 
Comm, 903 P. 2d 1246 cert. denied 517 U.S. 1163 (1996). 
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the course of determining whether an Aboriginal group could have been in 
exclusive occupation of their lands over time114. 
Before moving on it should be noted that these complicating factors 
are also present in the inland context, since common law public rights of 
navigation are recognized in navigable water bodies, such as the Great 
Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway. In turn, courts dealing with claims in 
such areas will likely have to consider whether Aboriginal title could co-
exist with those longstanding common law rights which apply to Canada’s 
navigable waterways. 
3.4 Application of Provincial Laws 
Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged lands also raise 
a number of interesting jurisdictional issues. A myriad of legislative enact-
ments seek to control and protect Canada’s inland waterways and offshore 
areas. For instance, several Canadian provinces have enacted legislation 
vesting the beds of inland navigable waterways in the Crown115. In addi-
tion, a vast body of provincial environmental and wildlife conservation leg-
islation carries implications for the management and use of both navigable 
and non-navigable water bodies. In the offshore context, statutory regimes 
have been established in order to deal with, among other things, offshore 
oil and gas exploitation116. If Aboriginal title were found in water spaces 
and submerged lands, courts would have to consider the applicability of 
this complex web of provincial legislation to those areas subject to title 
given that s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867117 provides that laws re-
lating to “Indians, and the lands reserved for Indians” fall within the exclu-
sive legislative jurisdiction of the federal government. 
The applicability of provincial legislation to matters falling within the 
scope of s. 91(24) has long been a matter of debate. In Delgamuukw Lamer 
114. Kent McNeil makes a similar point in Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra, note 76 at 
104-105, where he states that the existence of these public rights of navigation and fishing 
also excludes to a large extent the possibility of exclusive occupation of the underlying 
lands. For further information with respect to these and other issues arising in the off-
shore context, see : BROWN and REYNOLDS , supra, note 7 ; TZIMAS, supra, note 8 ; 
REYNOLDS, supra, note 28 ; BROWN, supra, note 85 ; RANKIN, supra, note 7. 
115. For instance, see the Ontario : Beds of Navigabee Waters Act, S.O. 1911, c. 6, s. 2 ; The 
Beds of Navigable Waters Amendment Act, 1951 S.O. 1951, c. 5 ; Beds of Navigable 
Waters Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B-4. 
116. One example is the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 43. 
117. Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.O 1985, App. II, No. 
5 [hereinafter Constituiion Act, 1867]. 
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C.J. stated that this section protects a “core” of Indianness from provincial 
intrusion through the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, and that this 
core falls within the scope of federal jurisdiction over Indians118. Accord-
ing to the learned justice, this core of Indianness encompasses Aboriginal 
rights, including the rights that are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1)119. 
Accordingly, laws that purport to extinguish those rights touch the core of 
Indianness that lies at the heart of s. 91(24), and are beyond the legislative 
competence of the provinces to enact120. 
In the context of Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged 
lands Lamer C.J.’s statements give rise to questions such as the following : 
Could provincial legislation vesting the beds of navigable waterways in the 
Crown be seen as an attempt on the part of provincial governments to ex-
tinguish any potential Aboriginal title rights in these waterways, and ac-
cordingly, be seen as falling outside of the legislative competence of the 
provinces ? Would provincial legislation governing the management and 
control of navigable waterways, or directed at water resource management 
issues, be viewed as legislation of general application, or would such enact-
ments be seen as being specifically aimed at Aboriginal title rights, and thus 
fall within the core of s. 91(24) ? With respect to this last question it is noted 
that while the provinces do not have jurisdiction to pass legislation directly 
aimed at matters falling within s 91(24) they do still appear to have the 
ability to incidentally affect matters coming within this section by way of 
legislation of general application121 
3.5 International Agreements and Obligations 
Lastly, Aboriginal title claims to water spaces and submerged lands 
may present a number of complex issues in the international context given 
the existence of international conventions and agreements pertaining to 
118. Delgamuulcw, supra, note 3 at para. 178. 
119. Ibid. 
120. Ibid. See also: Côté, supra, note 13 ; Sparrow, supra, note 60; R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 
S.C.R. 771. 
121. For instance, see Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission,, 2003 S.C.C. 
55. See also : R. v. Marshal,, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 ; [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 ; Kitkatla Band v. 
British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), 2002 S.C.C. 31 ; 
Dick v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309. For further information on this topic, see : TYLER, 
supra, note93 at 4-15 ; R.H. BARTLETT, Aboriginal Water Rights in Canada: A Study of 
Aboriginal Title to Water and Indian Water Rights, Saskatoon, Canadian Institute of 
Resources Law, 1988, at 117. See generally : K. M C N E I L , “Aboriginal Title and the Divi-
sion of Powers : Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction”, (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 
431 ; K. WILKINS, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights”, (1999) 22 Dalhousie L.J. 185. 
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Canada’s offshore areas and Great Lakes. As noted earlier, Canada’s rights 
in the offshore are subject to the international right of innocent passage, 
which allow for the passage of ships through a state’s territorial sea where 
such passage is for non-aggressive purposes122. In addition, a number of 
international agreements and conventions provide for the protection and 
conservation of offshore natural resources and fisheries123. Such interna-
tional instruments could pose major challenges in the offshore context. For 
instance, in the course of deciding an Aboriginal title claim in the offshore, 
the courts may have to consider what Canada’s international obligations 
might encompass if Aboriginal title were to be actually found in these ar-
eas. 
With regards to the inland context, the fact that the Canada-US bound-
ary line passes through the Great Lakes also presents a number of interest-
ing challenges in cases where Aboriginal groups seek title to the Great 
Lakes and their connecting waterways124. For instance, pursuant to the 
Boundary Waters Treaty 1909125 the navigable boundary waters of the 
Great Lakes should forever be free and open, and only those parties to the 
treaty, being Canada and the United States, can have control over these 
waters126. In the least, the existence of such treaty obligations would have 
to be considered by the courts in the course of assessing the viability of 
Aboriginal title in this context. 
122. See UNCLOS, supra, note 71 at article 17, part II. See also BROWN and REYNOLDS, 
supra, note 7, 458, for further discussion on this topic. 
123. See BROWN, supra, note 85, 17, for further information on international agreements such 
as the United Nations Conference on Straddiing Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (1995). It is worth noting here that negotiations are 
currently underway among the parties to the United Nations Conveniion on Biological 
Diversity with respect to access and benefit sharing of respect to genetic resources and 
organisms. A major issue for many States concerns genetic resources and living organ-
isms in offshore areas. Indigenous groups are actively participating in the negotiations 
and are pressing a rights agenda. For further information on the convention, see CON-
VENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY – UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME 
Homepag,, [Online], 2001, [www.biodiv.org] (January 18, 2005). Douglas Moodie has 
also noted that the Draft United Nations Declaraiion on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples contains interesting statements of indigenous entitlement to maritime title and 
resources. See United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populaiion, Draft United 
Nations Declaraiion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples August 23 1993 reproduced 
in [1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 48 at 45 as cited in MOODIE supra note 7 at para. 4. 
124. For a more in-depth discussion of the issues arising in the Great Lakes region by virtue 
of the Canada-US international boundary, see TZIMAS, supra, note 8 at 18-23. 
125. Schedule to the Internaiionll Boundary Waters Treaty Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-17. The 
treaty was confirmed and sanctioned in the Internaiional Boundary Waters Treaty Act : 
see TZIMAS, ibid. at 21. 
126. See TZIMAS, ibid., note 8 at 19-20. 
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Conclusion 
If one central theme emerges from this overview of Aboriginal title to 
water spaces and submerged lands it is likely that these particular types of 
claims will present extraordinary challenges in the coming years. A state of 
uncertainty will continue to prevail in this area until such time as the courts 
make pronouncements with respect to the viability of these claims. At the 
same time, negotiations concerning offshore oil and gas exploration and 
development will continue, statutory and regulatory regimes will continue 
to govern the use and management of our inland and offshore water areas, 
and, if the trends in other common law jurisdictions are any indication, 
more Aboriginal groups may decide to bring title claims to water spaces 
and submerged lands. So, the question becomes : What are we to do in the 
meantime ? 
Part of the answer may lie with the reconciliation imperative that un-
derpins s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. We have already seen how 
the principle of reconciliation might shape determinations with respect to 
the nature, scope and content of Aboriginal title. In addition, it is clear from 
existing jurisprudence that the purpose which lies at the core of s. 35(1) 
also allows for the curtailment of Aboriginal rights and title where the ob-
jectives furthered by the imposition of limits on s. 35 rights are of sufficient 
importance to the broader community as a whole127. According to the SCC 
in Sparrow, the government may infringe Aboriginal rights and title in those 
instances where they are able to justify this infringement pursuant to the 
test set out. This important decision also introduced the concept of an 
obligation on the Crown to consult with Aboriginal groups prior to infringe-
ment of their constitutionally protected rights. It is likely that the principle 
of consultation will play an integral role in the context of Aboriginal title 
claims to water spaces and submerged lands, particularly in those areas 
subject to extensive governmental regulation and natural resource exploi-
tation. 
In its latest pronouncements on the consultation issue in the Haidaws 
and Taku River129 cases the SCC held that both the federal and provincial 
Crowns have an obligation, based in the honour of the Crown, to consult 
127. Gladstone, supra, note 60, para. 73. See also : Sparrow, supra, note 60 ; Mitchell, supra, 
note 60 ; Van der Peet, supra, note 2 ; Delgamuukw, supra, note 3. 
128. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 S.C.C. 73 [hereinafter 
Haida]. 
129. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 
S.C.C. 74 [hereinafter Taku River]. 
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with Aboriginal groups, and if appropriate, to accommodate their inter-
ests130. This obligation is said to arise where the Crown has knowledge, 
real or constructive, of the potential existence of Aboriginal rights or title, 
and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect these rights131. Im-
portantly, the Court stressed that this obligation arises prior to proof of 
Aboriginal rights and title since limiting such reconciliation to the post-
proof sphere risks unfortunate consequences — Aboriginal peoples could 
find their land and resources changed and denuded by the time the goal of 
proof is finally reached132. 
While it is not yet clear whether Aboriginal title to water spaces and 
submerged lands constitute s. 35(1) rights133, the consultation principles 
articulated by the SCC in these cases will still likely play a prominent role 
in those situations where Aboriginal groups have asserted this particular 
form of title. The S C C s strong pronouncements with respect to the 
Crown’s duty of honourable dealings towards Aboriginal peoples, said to 
arise from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal people and 
their de facto control over land and resources formerly in the control of 
Aboriginal groups, lend support to this proposition134. 
However, seriously considering the role of consultation in the context 
of Aboriginal title claims to waters and submerged lands will not provide a 
complete answer to the question posed above. We will eventually have to 
turn our minds to the question of whether the test set out in Deegamuukw 
is an appropriate instrument to use where Aboriginal title claims fall out-
side common law concepts of property ownership. In addition, there may 
well be a need to look beyond the confines of available jurisprudence and 
to begin to truly think about how Aboriginal perspectives relating to land 
use and occupation should factor into our understandings of Aboriginal 
title. After all, these traditional patterns of use and occupation constitute 
the source of Aboriginal title, and as such, mandate both our understand-
ing and our respect. 
130. Haida, supra, note 128 at para. 25-35. 
131. Ibid. 
132. Ibid. at para. 33. 
133. At para. 37 of Haida, ibid., trie S>CC states that knowledge of a credible but unproven 
claim suttices to trigger a duty to consult and accommodate. Thus, the key issue in the 
context of claims to water spaces and submerged lands will be whether these particular 
claims will be viewed as being credible. 
134. tiaiaa, mid. at para. 32. 
